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Abstract. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) recently
proposed a standard for 5G telecommunications, containing an identity
protection scheme meant to address the long-outstanding privacy prob-
lem of permanent subscriber-identity disclosure. The proposal is essen-
tially two disjoint phases: an identiﬁcation phase, followed by an estab-
lishment of security context between mobile subscribers and their service
providers via symmetric-key based authenticated key agreement. Cur-
rently, 3GPP proposes to protect the identiﬁcation phase with a public-
key based solution, and while the current proposal is secure against a
classical adversary, the same would not be true of a quantum adver-
sary. 5G speciﬁcations target very long-term deployment scenarios (well
beyond the year 2030), therefore it is imperative that quantum-secure al-
ternatives be part of the current speciﬁcation. In this paper, we present
such an alternative scheme for the problem of private identiﬁcation pro-
tection. Our solution is compatible with the current 5G speciﬁcations,
depending mostly on cryptographic primitives already speciﬁed in 5G,
adding minimal performance overhead and requiring minor changes in
existing message structures. Finally, we provide a detailed formal security
analysis of our solution in a novel security framework.
Keywords: 5G Security · Authentication · Privacy · Mobile Networks.
1 Introduction
While many mobile users may be comfortable with the fact that their service
provider is able to identify them and track their geographical location ubiqui-
tously, fewer are likely to be comfortable with an arbitrary third party having
this capability. In hand of a third party, such capability could lead to unde-
sirable breaches of end user privacy, opening the door to a range of potential
consequences, such as harassment, stalking, employee monitoring, commercial
proﬁling, etc. For these reasons, the global mobile telephony standardization
body, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has identiﬁed the follow-
ing essential requirements related to user privacy [8]:
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 User Identity Conﬁdentiality1: The permanent identity of a user to whom
a service is delivered cannot be eavesdropped on the radio access link.
 User Location Conﬁdentiality: The presence or the arrival of a user in a
certain area cannot be determined by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
 User Untraceability: An intruder cannot deduce whether diﬀerent services
are delivered to the same user by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
In mobile telephony systems, networks allocate to each SIM card a unique iden-
tiﬁer,2 known up to the Fourth Generation (4G) as an International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and for the Fifth Generation (5G) as a Subscription
Permanent Identiﬁer (SUPI). As authentication between a user and its service
provider is based on a shared symmetric key, it can only take place after user
identiﬁcation. However, if the IMSI/SUPI values are sent in plaintext over the
radio access link, then users can be identiﬁed, located and tracked using these
permanent identiﬁers. To avoid this privacy breach, the SIM card is assigned
temporary identiﬁers (called Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) un-
til 3G systems and Globally Unique Temporary User Equipment Identity (GUTI)
for 4G and 5G systems) by the visited network. These frequently-changing tem-
porary identiﬁers are then used for identiﬁcation purposes over the radio access
link.
However, there are certain situations where authentication through the use
of temporary identiﬁers is not possible. For instance, when a user registers with a
network for the ﬁrst time and is not yet assigned a temporary identiﬁer. Another
case is when the visited network is unable to resolve the IMSI/SUPI from the
presented TMSI/GUTI. An active man-in-the-middle adversary can intention-
ally simulate this scenario to force an unsuspecting user to reveal its long-term
identity. These attacks are known as IMSI-catching attacks [17] and persist in
today's mobile networks including the 4G LTE/LTE+ [20].
Defeating IMSI Catchers in 5G. IMSI-catching attacks have threatened
all generations (2G/3G/4G) of mobile telecommunication for decades [5]. As
a result of facilitating backwards compatibility for legacy reasons, this privacy
problem appears to have persisted [6]. However, the 3GPP has now decided to ad-
dress this issue, albeit at the cost of backward compatibility. In case of identiﬁca-
tion failure via a 5G-GUTI, unlike earlier generations, 5G security speciﬁcations
do not allow plaintext transmissions of the SUPI over the radio interface [11].
Instead, an Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)-based privacy-
preserving identiﬁer containing the concealed SUPI is transmitted [22]. We elab-
orate upon the details of this scheme further in Section 3.1.
Motivation. It is hoped that 5G speciﬁcations will be ﬁnalized in 2019. The
ﬁrst practical 5G deployments can then be expected a number of years later.
1 The oﬃcial 3GPP documentation uses the term Identity Conﬁdentiality to refer
to the privacy of user identity. We follow the 3GPP naming convention.
2 Users can also be identiﬁed through other unique identiﬁers, for instance Inter-
national Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) which uniquely identiﬁes the mobile
equipment. However, it is only the IMSI/SUPI which is used for initial identiﬁcation
purposes.
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However, it will almost certainly take a decade or so before all legacy systems
are likely to be upgraded to 5G. It would thus seem that IMSI-catching attacks
will remain an issue in the mid-term future, possibly even beyond 2030. By
that time practical quantum computers will pose a much more immediate threat
than they do today [3, 14], particularly with respect to cryptographic schemes
such as ECIES, which are known to be vulnerable to quantum algorithms. The
impact of quantum computers on mobile networks is already being discussed
within the telephony industry [18], with a call to implement quantum-secure
cryptography. It is thus imperative that 5G security speciﬁcations such as 3GPP
TS 33.501 [11] (hereafter referred as TS 33.501) contain options for quantum-
resistant schemes. Fortunately, 5G security has mostly relied upon symmetric
cryptography for achieving its security objectives. However, the ECIES-based
identiﬁcation mechanism is an exception. In this paper, we propose a symmetric
alternative to the ECIES mechanism, so that the all symmetric stature of
5G security can continue in a quantum future. Any proposal for an alternative
user identiﬁcation scheme for 5G systems should strive to satisfy the following
requirements:
 Provision appropriate privacy guarantees such as anonymity and unlinkability
against a quantum adversary.
 The performance overhead should be minimalistic.
 Oﬀer appropriate deterrence against loss of synchronization between the user
and its home network.
 Fulﬁll Lawful Interception requirements (details in Section 2.3) in mobile
telecommunications.
 Ideally should adhere to the existing message structures as speciﬁed in current
5G speciﬁcations.
Our Contributions. The contributions of this paper are listed as below:
 We detail limitations of the ECIES-based identiﬁcation scheme of TS 33.501.
 We present an alternate quantum resistant scheme which overcomes the lim-
itations identiﬁed in the 3GPP scheme.
 We develop an appropriate model of security and formally prove the privacy
guarantees oﬀered by our proposal in this model.
Related Work. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work on 5G identity con-
ﬁdentiality since the publication of TS 33.501. Before a protection scheme was
chosen, a study was conducted by 3GPP to evaluate a number of potential so-
lutions. In total 24 proposals were considered, details of which can be found in
the associated report 3GPP TR 33.899 (cf. Clause 5.7.4) [7]. Most (but not all)
proposals were based on public-key cryptography, and the ECIES-based mech-
anism was selected as the ﬁnal candidate. The few symmetric-key proposals all
relied on utilizing pseudonyms for privacy purposes, and thus were susceptible
to desynchronization attacks potentially causing permanent DoS attacks on the
mobile users.
Various academic works have considered IMSI-catching attacks. The ma-
jor thrust of these papers has been to devise a solution for 3G/4G without
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modifying the existing message structures out of concern for legacy devices and
backwards-compatibility. Broek et al. [2] introduced a proposal based on chang-
ing pseudonyms, and required no modiﬁcations to the existing infrastructure.
As a result of reliance on changing pseudonyms this solution was susceptible to
desynchronization attacks. A similar proposal was that by Khan and Mitchell [15]
which relied on using a set of IMSIs for a particular USIM to oﬀer some degree of
pseudonymity, however as in the case of [2], this solution could also get knocked
out of the service permanently. Khan and Mitchell, based upon their previous
work, subsequently presented an improved solution [16]. This solution relied
on using a dynamic pseudo-IMSI for identiﬁcation purposes, however identity
desynchronization attacks still had the potential to cause permanent denial of
service. Thus their solution is accompanied with an identity recovery mechanism
(in case of desynchronization) which required no changes to the existing mes-
sage structures. However, this solution fails to satisfy the LI requirements (see
Section 2.3) without further changes to the existing message structures.
Paper Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives
background on the 5G security architecture. Section 3 details the current iden-
tity conﬁdentiality mechanism of 5G and its limitations. Section 4 introduces our
proposal for 5G identity conﬁdentiality, we deﬁne a security framework in Sec-
tion 5 with which to assess our proposal, and in Section 6 presents its analysis.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the article.
2 Essential Background on 5G Telephony
Here we explain the pertinent constituents of the 5G security ecosystem. We use
a simpler terminology than that used in TS 33.501 in order to improve clarity.
2.1 Network Architecture
The mobile telephony network architecture consists of three major entities. User
Equipment (UE), refers to a complete mobile phone and covers both the Mo-
bile Equipment (ME) (the phone) and the Universal Subscriber Identity Mod-
ule (USIM) (the SIM card). The USIM represents the relationship between the
subscriber (end user) and its issuing Home Network (HN). During the USIM
registration, the HN stores a unique SUPI, telephone number and other sub-
scriber related data, including a secret key K and sequence number SQN, in the
USIM. These subscriber related parameters also get stored by the corresponding
HNs in their databases. These stored parameters later form the basis for security
between the UEs and their HNs. Usually, a semi-trusted Serving Network (SN)
provides the subscribers with access to the services of their HN. These services
are provisioned after mutual authentication and establishment of a secure chan-
nel between the UE and SN with the help of the HN. When roaming, the serving
network is referred to as the visited network. The communication medium be-
tween the UE and SN is wireless while that between the SN and HN is almost
always a wired one.
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2.2 Terminologies and Identities
A SUPI as deﬁned in 3GPP TS 23.501 is usually a string of 15 decimal digits [12].
The ﬁrst three digits represent the Mobile Country Code (MCC) while the next
two or three form the Mobile Network Code (MNC) identifying the network
operator. The length of the MNC ﬁeld is a national aﬀair. The remaining (nine
or ten) digits are known asMobile Subscriber Identiﬁcation Number (MSIN) and
represent the individual user of that particular operator. Each decimal digit of
the SUPI is represented in binary by using the Telephony Binary Coded Decimal
(TBCD) encoding [10]. The IMEI which uniquely identiﬁes the ME, is a string
of 15 digits. If the IMEI is sent in plaintext over the radio interface it could
compromise user privacy; however from 4G onwards, the 3GPP speciﬁcations
prohibit a UE from transmitting the IMEI until after establishment of a secure
channel.
2.3 The 5G AKA
Security of communications between mobile subscribers and their service providers
requires mutual authentication and key agreement. The 3GPP standard for 5G
security speciﬁes two Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocols, Extensi-
ble Authentication Protocol AKA' (EAP-AKA') and 5G-AKA. EAP-AKA' is
speciﬁed in RFC 5448 [1] while 5G-AKA is detailed in TS 33.501 (cf. sub-clause
6.1.3.2) [11]. The two protocols are mostly identical, we therefore consider only
the 5G-AKA further in this paper. The 5G-AKA is instantiated with a set of
seven unrelated symmetric key algorithms, denoted as f1,. . ., f5, f1
∗ and f5∗.
Algorithms f1, f2 and f1
∗ act as message authentication functions, while f3, f4,
f5 and f5
∗ are used as key derivation functions3. Detail of how these crypto-
graphic algorithms are used for calculation of various parameters and a pictorial
representation of the 5G-AKA can be found in Table 1 and Figure 1 respectively.
As already described in Section 2.1, the shared long-term secret key K, sequence
number SQN and long-term identity SUPI are stored in both UE and HN dur-
ing USIM registration. The sequence numbers assure freshness in the 5G-AKA.
All key derivation for 5G-AKA is performed using the Key Derivation Function
(KDF) speciﬁed in 3GPP TS 33.220 [9]. The 5G-AKA protocol works as follows:
0. 4 To initiate authentication, the UE sends the SN either the 5G-GUTI in
a registration request message or the SUCI as response to an identiﬁer
request message (See Section 3 for further details).
1. In case of a 5G-GUTI, the SN extracts the corresponding SUPI from its
database and forwards it along with its serving network name (SN name)
to the HN in an authenticate request message. Otherwise the SUCI is sent
instead of the SUPI.
3 The 3GPP documentation uses the term key generating function for these algo-
rithms, while these are technically key derivation functions.
4 This ﬁrst Step is numbered 0 because its not an exclusive part of the AKA but
rather the identiﬁcation phase.
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Table 1: Description of 5G-AKA parameters
Parameter Content/Description
RAND 128 bit Random Challenge
SQN 48 bit Sequence Number
AMF 16 bit Authentication Management Field
SNname Serving Network Name
AK f5(K,RAND)
CK f3(K,RAND)
IK f4(K,RAND)
RES f2(K,RAND)
MAC f1(K,SQN‖RAND‖AMF )
AUTN (SQN ⊕AK‖AMF‖MAC)
RES∗/XRES∗ KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖RAND‖RES/XRES)
HXRES∗/HRES∗ SHA256(RAND‖XRES∗/RES∗)
KAUSF KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖SQN ⊕AK)
KSEAF KDF (KAUSF , SNname)
AV (RAND‖AUTN‖HXRES∗‖KSEAF )
2. If the SUCI is received in an authenticate request message by HN, it de-
conceals (for details see Section 3.1) the SUPI from it. It further derives the
expected response XRES* and generates the authentication vector AV. The
AV consists of a random challenge RAND, an authentication token AUTN,
a hash of expected response HXRES* and an anchor key KSEAF which is
cryptographically bound to the requesting SN.
3. The HN stores XRES*.
4. The HN forwards the 5G AV (RAND, AUTN, HXRES*, KSEAF) in an au-
thenticate response message to the SN.
5. The SN forwards RAND, AUTN to the UE in an Auth-Req message.
6. Upon receiving the RAND and AUTN, the UE veriﬁes the freshness and
authenticity as described in [8]. It then computes the response RES* and
derives the anchor key KSEAF to be used for establishment of the secure
channel with the SN.
7. The UE returns RES* in an Auth-Resp message to the SN.
8. The SN then computes the hash of the response HRES* from the received
RES* and compares HRES* with XHRES*. If they are equal, the SN con-
siders the authentication successful.
9. The SN then sends RES*, as received from the UE, to the HN in an au-
thentication conﬁrmation message (containing the SUPI or SUCI and the
serving network name).
10. When the HN receives a conﬁrmation message, it compares RES* with the
stored XRES*. If these two are equal, the HN considers the conﬁrmation
message as successfully veriﬁed.
11. Finally, the HN indicates to the SN in a conﬁrmation response message
whether the conﬁrmation was successful or not. If the HN received a SUCI
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Fig. 1: Overview of the 5G-AKA Protocol
from the SN when authentication was initiated, and if the conﬁrmation is
successful, then the HN also includes the SUPI in this message.
Lawful Interception. Note that in Step 11 of the 5G-AKA, the HN provides
the SUPI of the UE to the SN after successful authentication. This is due to the
Lawful Interception (LI) requirements. The law enforcement agencies of almost
all countries require that their local service providers should have the capability
to locate and track any particular mobile user within the country. The SUPI is
later used as an input to the session key derivation function between UE and
SN. This ensures that the SUPI value provisioned by the HN is the one claimed
by the UE, otherwise the communication breaks down.
3 Identity Conﬁdentiality in 5G
In the 5G system, Subscription Concealed Identiﬁer (SUCI) is a privacy pre-
serving identiﬁer containing the concealed SUPI. The UE generates a SUCI
using a protection scheme (see Section 3.1) with the public key of the HN that
was securely provisioned to the USIM during the USIM registration. Only the
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MSIN part of the SUPI gets concealed by the protection scheme while the home
network identiﬁer (MCC/MNC) gets transmitted in plaintext. The data ﬁelds
constituting the SUCI are:
 Protection Scheme Identiﬁer. This ﬁeld represents the null scheme5 or
any other speciﬁed protection scheme.
 Home Network Public Key Identiﬁer. This represents the public key
provisioned by the HN. In case of a null scheme, this ﬁeld is set to null.
 Home Network Identiﬁer. This contains the MCC and MNC part of the
SUPI.
 Protection Scheme Output. This represents the output of the public key
based protection scheme.
The subscriber identiﬁcation mechanism allows the identiﬁcation of a UE on the
radio path by means of the SUCI. This mechanism is usually invoked by the SN
by sending an Identiﬁer Request to the UE, when the UE is not identiﬁable
by means of a temporary identity. The UE then responds with the Identiﬁer
Response, containing the SUCI. Additionally, if the UE sends a Registration
Request message of type initial registration to a mobile network for which it
does not already have a 5G-GUTI, then the UE includes a SUCI to the Regis-
tration Request.
3.1 ECIES-based Protection Scheme
We now provide an overview of the ECIES-based protection scheme as described
in TS 33.501 (cf. Annex C.3) [11]. To compute a fresh SUCI, the UE generates
a fresh ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) ephemeral public/private key pair
utilizing the HN public key. Processing on the UE side is done according to the
encryption operation deﬁned in [19] and as further illustrated in Figure 2a. The
ﬁnal output of this protection scheme is the concatenation of the ECC ephemeral
public key, the ciphertext value, the MAC tag value, and any other parameters, if
applicable. The HN uses the received ECC ephemeral public key and its private
key to deconceal the received SUCI. Processing on the HN side is illustrated in
Figure 2b.
3.2 Limitations of the 3GPP Protection Scheme
Although the ECIES-based scheme is oblivious to loss of synchronization be-
tween the UE and HN and provisions robust key management, both of which
lead to signiﬁcant reduction in connection failures, there still are aspects which
require further improvement [4].
Post Quantum Vulnerability. As the ECIES-based scheme employs ECC
to provision identity conﬁdentiality, it relies on the hardness assumption of the
5 The null-scheme is used only if the UE is making an unauthenticated emergency
session or if the HN has conﬁgured null-scheme to be used or if the HN has not
provisioned the public key needed to generate SUCI.
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(a) Encryption at UE side
(b) Decryption at HN side
Fig. 2: Detail of ECIES-based Protection Scheme
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). A quantum adversary
capable of issuing quantum queries to an appropriate quantum computer can
easily break this scheme employing Shor's quantum algorithm [21].
Chosen SUPI Attacks. Any arbitrary third party can always select a SUPI
of his choosing and send the corresponding SUCI to the HN. Thereafter the
adversary can look out for various responses from the HN, depending on whether
the target user is present in that particular cell tower or not. Any noticeable
variation in the perceived output would allow the adversary to conﬁrm or deny
the presence of the target in that particular cell. There is no mechanism in the
ECIES-based scheme to prevent these kind of attacks.
Replay Attacks. Note that the ECIES-based scheme does not have any in-
herent mechanism to provide freshness guarantees to the HN and is thus suscep-
tible to replay attacks. An adversary can always resend a previously encrypted
SUPI to the HN and look out for various kinds of responses (an authentication
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challenge or a failure message). Based on the received response, a device whose
SUPI is unknown to the attacker may be tracked with some conﬁdence.
Bidding Down Attacks. An active adversary simulating a (false) base
station can force the UE to use one of the previous generation (3G/4G) and
then can get hold of the IMSI using an identity request message. Until all systems
upgrade to 5G, nothing much can be done about these bidding down attacks. In
the current 5G security speciﬁcations [11], the SUPI is derived directly from the
IMSI, so these bidding down attacks also compromise the SUPI.
Update of HN Public Key. There could be situations which require the
HN to have a robust way of quickly updating its public key to subscriber UEs.
One such scenario could be a malware attack which tries to recover the home
network's private key. Such situations enforce the need to have a quick way of
updating the corresponding public keys.
4 Towards Quantum Resistant Identity Conﬁdentiality
We now detail our proposal for an alternative protection scheme. Unlike the
ECIES-based scheme, our proposal mostly requires the cryptographic primitives
already provisioned by the current 5G speciﬁcations. We utilise the previously
speciﬁed key derivation and message authentication functions of the 5G-AKA
for our proposal. Speciﬁcally, we use function f1 for message authentication and
functions f3, f4, f5 and f5
∗ for key derivation. As elaborated in 3GPP TS 33.102,
no valuable information can be inferred from the values of any of these functions
about other functions [8]. Table 2 gives a summary of notations used in the
proposed scheme and Figure 3 provides an overview of the proposed scheme.
Various phases of the scheme are explained further.
Table 2: Notation used in the proposed scheme
Notation Description
A and B Identiﬁcation parameters generated by HN
SQNID Counter used for replay prevention
KHN Long term secret key of HN
KN Randomly generated ephemeral parameter
RANDID Freshly generated random number
CKID Conﬁdentiality key
AKID Anonymity key
MACID MAC Tag
f1 Message Authentication Function
f3, f4, f5, f5
∗ Key Derivation Functions
AE.Enc Authenticated Encryption Function
AE.Dec Authenticated Decryption Function
f(K,X) Execution of keyed-function f upon input X with key K
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Fig. 3: Our Proposed Protection Scheme PQID
4.1 System Setup Phase
The HN generates a long-term secret key KHN for the calculation of identiﬁca-
tion parameters for its subscribers. HN stores this value internally in some secure
way, allowing no other entity access. HN randomly chooses KN during the UE
registration and computes the (data) conﬁdentiality key CKID = f4(KHN ,KN )
for the protection scheme as well as identiﬁcation parameters A = SUPI⊕CKID
and B = KHN ⊕KN . In addition to the SUPI , the AKA sequence number SQN
and the shared key K (which are all from the original 5G-AKA), the UE also
stores identiﬁcation parameters A and B along with an additional 48 bit iden-
tiﬁcation sequence number SQNIDUE with initial value set to 1. HN initialises
a corresponding identiﬁcation sequence number SQNIDHN
6 with initial value
6 Note that HN will maintain a separate distinct value of SQNIDHN for each UE in
its database.
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of 0 and stores SQNIDHN in its database. An algorithmic description of the
computations of HN during this phase can be found below:
1. KHN
$← {0, 1}λ
2. For each UE :
KN
$← {0, 1}λ
SQNIDUE ← 1
SQNIDHN ← 0
CKID ← f4(KHN ,KN )
3. A← SUPI ⊕ CKID
4. B ← KHN ⊕KN
5. K
$← {0, 1}λ
6. UE ← (SUPI ,K,A,B)
4.2 Identiﬁcation Phase
An algorithmic description of the operations of UE and HN during this phase
are presented below. Note that the output of f3(K,RANDID) is truncated
to get a 48 bit AKID . The UE prepares the SUCI = (labelps, ∅, labelHN ,
(D‖A‖B‖C‖MACID)) using various data ﬁelds7 as explained in Section 3 and
forwards SUCI to SN . The SN appends its SN-name (cf. Clause 6.1.1.4 of [11])
to the received SUCI and forwards the resulting message to HN . Upon success-
ful MAC veriﬁcation, HN accepts the extracted SUPI as valid for subsequent
processing.
Description of UE's operations:
1. RANDID
$← {0, 1}λ
2. CKID ← A⊕ SUPI
3. AKID ← f3(K,RANDID)
4. IKID ← f5(K,RANDID)
5. C ← RANDID ⊕ CKID
6. D ← SQNIDUE ⊕AKID
7. MACID ← f1(IKID , D‖A‖B‖C)
8. SUCI ← (labelps, , labelHN ,
D‖A‖B‖C‖MACID)
9. SQNIDUE ← SQNIDUE + 1
Description of HN's operations:
1. KN ← KHN ⊕B
2. CKID ← f4(KHN ,KN )
3. SUPI ← A⊕ CKID
4. RANDID ← C ⊕ CKID
5. AKID ← f3(K,RANDID)
6. IKID ← f5(K,RANDID)
7. SQNID∗ ← D ⊕AKID
8. if SQNID∗ ≤ SQNIDHN abort
9. MACID∗ ← f1(IKID , D‖A‖B‖C)
10. if MACID 6= MACID∗ abort
11. SQNIDHN ← SQNID∗
4.3 Update Phase
An algorithmic description of the operations of UE and HN during this phase can
be found below. The output of the encryption scheme AE.EncEK(A
+‖B+) gets
7 Note that labelps is a constant value indicating the protection scheme, and labelHN
is a constant value identifying the HN .
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appended to the 5G-AKA authentication vector AV and is forwarded to the SN
as part of the authenticate response message (Step 4 in Figure 1) of the 5G-AKA.
The SN upon receipt of the response message undertakes the required steps
necessary for 5G-AKA and forwards the encrypted identiﬁcation parameters to
the UE along with the 5G-AKA authentication challenge parameters RAND
(note that RAND is unrelated to RANDID) and AUTN (Step 5 in Figure 1).
Algorithmic description of HN 's
operations in the Update Phase:
1. KN
+ ← {0, 1}λ
2. CKID+ ← f4(KHN ,KN+)
3. A+ ← SUPI ⊕ CKID+
4. B+ ← KHN ⊕KN+
5. EK ← f5∗(K,RANDID)
6. EKID ← AE.Enc(EK , A+‖B+)
Algorithmic description of UE 's oper-
ations in the Update Phase:
1. EK ← f5∗(K,RANDID)
2. A+‖B+ ← AE.Dec(EK ,EKID)
3. A, B ← A+, B+
5 Security Framework
In this section, we introduce our Symmetric Updatable Private Authentication
(SUPA) experiment, that follows in the long tradition of standard Bellare-Rogaway
key-indistinguishability games. Essentially, a SUPA protocol is a protocol that
authenticates an end-user to a central node via a shared symmetric key in a pri-
vate way. In comparison to similar BR-styled mutual authentication games, our
SUPA framework diverges by considering identity conﬁdentiality. In particular,
the SUPA security experiment asks the adversary to decide which of two par-
ties attempted to authenticate itself to a centralised home network. In addition,
SUPA distinguishes itself by considering a multi-stage authentication protocol -
i.e. subsequent authentication attempts between the UE and the HN (after the
ﬁrst successful authentication) are not independent, but instead dependent on
values derived from previous stages. This allows us to capture both User Iden-
tity Conﬁdentiality and User Untraceability from the 3GPP requirements of user
privacy. We can now turn to formally deﬁning a SUPA protocol.
Deﬁnition 1 (Symmetric Updatable Private Authentication). A Sym-
metric Updatable Private Authentication (SUPA) protocol is a tuple of algorithms
{SetupHN, SetupUE, Identify,Update}.
 SetupHN(λ)→ KHN : SetupHN takes as input some security parameter λ and
outputs a long-term symmetric key KHN .
 SetupUE(λ,KHN ) → K, st: SetupHN takes as input some security parameter
λ and a long-term symmetric key KHN , and outputs some shared (between the
UE and the HN ) secret state st and a shared symmetric key K.
 Identify(role,m, st,KHN )→ (id,m′, st′): Identify takes as input the role of the
party in the protocol execution, a (potentially empty) message m, the internal
state of the party st and (if role = HN ) the long-term HN key KHN , and
outputs an identiﬁer id, a new (potentially empty) message m′, and an updated
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state st′. Note that the identiﬁer id doubles as a failure ﬂag if the Identify
algorithm is forced to abort.
 Update(role,m, st,KHN ) → (m′, st′): Update takes as input the role of the
party in the protocol execution, a (potentially empty) message m, the internal
state of the party st and (if role = HN ) the long-term HN key KHN , and
outputs a new (potentially empty) message m′, an updated state st′. As in
Identify, the output message m′ doubles as a failure ﬂag if the Update algorithm
is forced to abort.
5.1 Execution Environment
Here we describe the execution environment of the SUPA security experiment.
The experiment ExpSUPAΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ) is played between a challenger C and an adver-
saryA. The challenger C maintains a single HN , running a number of instances of
the SUPA protocol Π, and a set of (up to) nN users UE 1, . . . ,UEnN (represent-
ing nodes communicating with the home network HN ), each potentially running
a single session executing (up to) nS consecutive stages of Π. The protocol Π is
represented as a tuple of algorithms SUPA= {SetupHN, SetupUE, Identify,Update}.
We abuse notation and use pisi to refer to both the identiﬁer of the s-th stage of
Π being run by node UE i and the collection of per-session variables maintained
for this stage. Each session maintains the following set of per-session variables:
 i ∈ {1, . . . , nN} - the index of the party UE i.
 ltk ∈ {0, 1}λ - the long-term symmetric secret of UE i, shared with HN .
 id ∈ {0, 1}∗ - the identiﬁer of party UE i.
 ms ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the concatenation of messages sent by the session, ini-
tialised by ⊥.
 mr ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the concatenation of messages received by the session,
initialised by ⊥.
 st ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} - the per-stage secret state of the session, initialised by ⊥.
 s ∈ {1, . . . , nS} - the index of the most recently completed authentication
stage, initialised by 1 and increased monotonically.
 α ∈ {active, accept,⊥} - the current status of the session, initialised by ⊥.
Our experiment begins with the challenger C sampling the random test bit
b
$← {0, 1}. The challenger generates the long-term symmetric key of the HN
KHN and initialises its corruption registers (which maintain the list of secrets A
has leaked). At this point, A now gains access to the queries listed in Section 5.2
and eventually terminates and outputs a single guess bit b′. If A has caused
the challenger to either execute Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN ) → (id,m′, st′)
such that there exists some session pisi .id = id, but m 6⊂ pisi .ms8 or; execute
Update(UE ,m, pisi .st, ) → (m′, st′) such that m′ 6= ⊥ but there was no execu-
tion of Update(role∗,m∗, st∗,KHN ) → (m, st′′). If either of these are true and
fresh(i, s) = true then C returns 1. Otherwise, if A issued a Test(i∗, s∗) query,
then C computes fresh(i∗, s∗). If fresh(i∗, s∗) is true, then the challenger returns
(b = b′), otherwise the challenger returns b∗ $← {0, 1}.
8 Note that here we are using ⊂ to indicate substrings
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ExpSUPA,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ):
1: b
$← {0, 1}
2: KHN
$← SetupHN(λ)
3: LSKflagi, . . . , LSKflagnN ← clean
4: PSSflag11, . . . ,PSSflag
nN
nS
← clean
5: ctr ← 0
6: b′ $← ASend?,Create,Corrupt,StateReveal(λ)
7: if ∃ (i∗, s∗) s.t.
((Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN ) →
(id,m′, st) s.t pis
∗
i∗ .id = id,
m 6= pis∗i∗ .mr) ∧ (clean(pis
∗
i∗ )))
∨ ((Update(UE ,m, pis∗i∗ .st, ) →
(m′, st′) s.t. m′ 6= ⊥,
@Update(HN ,m∗,HN .st,KHN ) →
(m,HN st′))) ∧ (clean(pis∗i∗ ))) then
8: return 1
9: end if
10: if clean(pib) ∧ clean(pi1−b) then
11: return (b′ = b)
12: else
13: return b′ $← {0, 1}
14: end if
Test((i, s), (i′, s′)):
1: if (pisi .α = active) ∨ (pis
′
i′ .α = active)
then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: if (b = 0) then
5: pib ← pisi
6: pib−1 ← pis′i′
7: else
8: pib ← pis′i′
9: pib−1 ← pisi
10: end if
11: m← Π.Identify(UE ,⊥, pib.st,⊥)
12: return m
StateReveal(i, s):
1: if pisi .st = ⊥ then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: PSSflagis ← corrupt
5: return pisi .st
Create(λ):
1: ctr ← ctr + 1
2: pi.s← 1
3: pi.ltk, pi.st← Π.SetupUE(λ,KHN )
4: pi.i← ctr
5: return pi.i
SendTest(m):
1: Send(pib,m)→ m′
2: return m′
Send(role, i,m):
1: if role = HN then
2: (HN .st′,m′)← Π.F (λ,HN ,m)
3: end if
4: let s = max{s : pisi .α 6= ⊥}
5: if pisi .α 6= active then
6: return ⊥
7: end if
8: pisi .mr ← pisi .mr‖m
9: (pisi ,m
′)← Π.F (λ, pisi ,m)
10: pisi .ms ← pisi .ms‖m′
11: return m′
Corrupt(i):
1: LSKflagi ← corrupt
2: return pii.ltk
Fig. 4: An algorithmic description of the SUPA security experiment. We assume
the existence of a function F that is capable of taking as input a message m
and the current internal state pisi .st of the protocol execution and forwarding the
inputs to either Update or Identify as appropriate. We refer to the test session
in the description of the SUPA experiment as pib (and the other session as pi1−b).
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5.2 Adversary Queries
Here we describe the intuition behind each query that A has access to during
the SUPA experiment. For full details on each of these queries, see Figure 4.
 Create(i): Allows A to initialise a new UE party with shared symmetric state
and shared symmetric key with HN .
 Send(i, s,m) → m′: Sends a message m to session pisi , which updates the
per-session variables, returning a (potentially empty) message m′.
 Corrupt(i)→ pii.ltk: Reveals to A the long-term symmetric key of UE i
 Test(i, s, i′, s′) → m: Uses the random bit b sampled by C to begin a new
Identify phase with either pisi (if b = 0) or pi
s′
i′ (if b = 1). For ease of notation,
we refer to the test session as pib (and the other session as pi1−b. Note that
A cannot issue this query if there exists some stage s such that either pisi .α =
active or pis
′
i′ .α = active, nor can A issue Send queries to pisi or pis
′
i′ until pib
has either accepted or rejected the protocol execution.
 SendTest(m) → m′: Allows A to send a message m to the test session pib
after A has issued a Test query. After pib.α 6= active, then the challenger
responds to SendTest queries with ⊥.
 StateReveal(i, s)→ pisi : Reveals to A the full internal state of pisi
5.3 Security Deﬁnitions
Here we deﬁne the security of a Symmetric Updatable Private Authentication
Protocols, and additionally show that the PQID protocol described in Figure 3
executes correctly in the presence of a passive adversary.
Deﬁnition 2 (Private Authentication Security). Let Π be a SUPA proto-
col, and nN , nS ∈ N. For a given cleanness predicate clean, and a PPT algorithm
A, we deﬁne the advantage of A in the SUPA game to be:
AdvSUPA,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = |Pr[Exp
SUPA,clean
Π,nN ,nS ,A(λ) = 1]−
1
2
|.
We say that Π is SUPA-secure if, for all A, AdvSUPA,cleanΠ,nN ,nS ,A(λ) is negligible in the
security parameter λ.
We also need to deﬁne Identiﬁcation Correctness as well as Update Correct-
ness, to ensure that we only capture protocols that are actually useful.
Deﬁnition 3 (Identiﬁcation Correctness). Let Π be a SUPA protocol. We
say that Π has identiﬁcation correctness if after an execution of Identify(HN ,m′,
HN .st,KHN )→ (id′,m∗, st′) in the presence of a passive adversary A such that
for some session pisi .ms = m
′, then pisi .id = id
′.
It is fairly straightforward to see that the proposed protocol in Figure 3
has identiﬁcation correctness: The ﬁelds A = SUPI ⊕ CKID and B = KHN ⊕
KN sent by the UE contains all the information necessary to recompute the
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identiﬁer SUPI of the UE . HN ﬁrst computes KN = B⊕KHN and then CKID =
f4(KHN ,KN ). Retrieving SUPI is then simply a matter of SUPI ← A⊕CKID .
Update correctness is a little diﬀerent to identiﬁcation correctness. We only
require that the session executing an Update using output from HN simply
updates their state without aborting the protocol execution, instead of having
to agree to some shared updated state. This is to capture stateless HN sessions
that simply regenerate per-session state when required, usually by processing
client-maintained tokens. In this sense, the A and B values sent by the UE
during our PQID protocol are tokens that allow HN to recover per-session state.
Deﬁnition 4 (Update Correctness). Let Π be a SUPA protocol. We say that
Π has update correctness if after an execution of Update(UE ,m′, pisi .st, ) →
(m∗, pisi .st
′) in the presence of a passive adversary A such that for some execution
of Update(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN ) → (m′,HN .st′), then m∗ 6= ⊥ and pisi .st′ 6=
pisi .st.
Similarly to identiﬁcation correctness, it is straightforward to see that the
proposed protocol in Figure 3 has update correctness: The ﬁelds A+ = SUPI ⊕
CKID+ and B+ = KHN ⊕ KN+ encrypted under EK = f5∗(K,RANDID) sent
by the HN contains all the information necessary to update the values A, B and
CKID . UE computes EK = f5∗(K,RANDID) (where RANDID was sampled
initially by UE and K is the long-term symmetric key shared by UE and HN ,
so both are known to UE ), and decrypts A+ and B+. Afterwards, UE updates
A← A+, B ← B+, CKID ← A+ ⊕ SUPI .
Finally, we require a cleanness predicate, in order to disallow combinations
of Corrupt and StateReveal queries that allow an adversary to trivially break
SUPA security. We do not capture notions of forward secrecy, so our cleanness
predicate is very simple: A is not allowed to break sessions that it has issued
either a Corrupt or a StateReveal query to.
Deﬁnition 5 (SUPA-clean). A session pisi in the SUPA experiment deﬁned in
Figure 4 is clean if LSKflagi 6= corrupt and PSSflagsi 6= corrupt.
6 Analysis of the Proposed Protection Scheme
In this section we discuss and analyse our proposed 5G identiﬁcation scheme
within the SUPA security framework, and show that it achieves the notion of
Symmetric Updatable Private Authentication protocols.
6.1 Formal Analysis
Theorem 1. The SUPA protocol PQID given in Figure 3 is SUPA-secure under
cleanness predicate clean and assuming all hash functions are random oracles.
For any PPT algorithm A against the SUPA experiment, AdvSUPA,clean
PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) is
negligible under the AuthEnc, kdf and eufcma security assumptions of the AE,
KDF and MAC schemes, respectively.
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Proof. Before we begin our analysis in earnest, we show that an adversary A
is unable to recover the long-term symmetric-key of the home network KHN
(with non-negligible probability) even if A reveals all long-term secrets K of all
nodes and all per-stage secret states st assuming underlying hash functions are
random oracles. In our proof we work within the random oracle model, and A
cannot learn anything about KHN from hash outputs H(KHN , X) (where X is
any concatenation of arbitrary values). We turn to A attempting to learn KHN
that has been blinded through exclusive-or (XOR) operations, which are only
sent in the following values: B = KHN ⊕ KN and B+ = KHN ⊕ KN+. KN and
KN
+ are acting as one-time-pads encrypting the long-term symmetric key of the
home network HN , and each KN /KN
+ is a value internal to the home network
that cannot be compromised via A issuing a Corrupt or StateReveal query. A
therefore cannot recover KHN in this way, but can attempt to guess and verify
the guess by ﬁrst querying StateReveal to any UE party, recovering CKID
and B, and querying the random oracle with (KHN
′, B ⊕KHN ′) and comparing
the output of the random oracle with CKID . The probability of A's success in
this strategy is qr/2λ−1. (where qr is the number of queries that A makes to the
random oracle and λ is the bit-length of KHN ). During our analysis then, we
assume that in each stage of a protocol execution KHN is indistinguishable from
a uniformly-random value KHN
∗ from the same distribution.
In our analysis, we split our proof into three cases:
1. A has caused a session pisi to reach a status accept when calling Update(UE ,
m, pisi .st, ) such that m is not the output of HN and clean(pi
s
i ) = true.
2. A has caused HN to call Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN ) → (id′,m′,HN .st′)
such that ∃pisi .id = id′, butm was not the output of some Identify(UE , , pisi .st, )
and clean(pisi ) = true.
3. A has output a guessed bit b′ after issuing a Test(i, s, i′, s′) query
We show that A has negligible advantage in causing the ﬁrst two cases to
occur, and thus A also has negligible advantage in winning the SUPA experiment
in the third case. Due to space constraints we instead provide a proof sketch.
Case 1. We begin by guessing the session pisi such that pi
s
i has reached a sta-
tus accept when calling Update(UE ,m, pisi .st, ) and m is not an output of the
home network HN . Next, we replace the keys AKID , IKID and EK computed
in the session pisi with uniformly-random values AKID
∗, IKID∗ and EK ∗ from
{0, 1}|KDF| where |KDF| represents the output length of KDF, by interacting
with a challenger implementing a KDF security game. Finally, we deﬁne an
abort event abortdec that occurs when pi
s
i sets pi
s
i .α ← accept during a call
to Update(UE ,m, pisi .st, ) and m is not the output of the home network HN .
We do this by constructing a simulator B that interacts with an AE challenger,
computing AE.Enc(EK ∗, A+‖B+) by querying (A+‖B+, A+‖B+) to the LoR AE
challenger's AuthEnc oracle instead of computing it honestly. Thus, if abortdec
occurs, then m is a ciphertext that decrypts correctly by the AE challenger, but
was not the output of the query (A+‖B+, A+‖B+) to the LoR AE challenger's
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AuthEnc oracle. Thus, when abortdec occurs, B has broken the ae security of the
AE challenger, and we have bound the advantage of A in causing pisi to accept
an Update when the received message was not the honest output of the HN .
Case 2. Similarly to Case 1 we begin by guessing the index of the session
pisi and replacing the keys AKID , IKID and EK computed in any stage s of
the session pisi and the HN with uniformly-random values AKID
∗, IKID∗ and
EK ∗. However, in Case 2 we interact with nS challengers implementing nS KDF
security games. Finally, we deﬁne an abort event abortmac that occurs when
HN outputs pisi .id = id
′ during a call to Identify(HN ,m,HN .st,KHN ) and m is
not the output of some stage s of the sessions owned by UE i. We do this by
constructing a simulator B that interacts with an MAC challenger, computing
MAC(IKID∗, D‖A‖B‖C) by querying (D‖A‖B‖C) to the MAC challenger in-
stead of computing it honestly within HN or any session owned by UE i. Thus,
if abortmac occurs, then A has managed to produce a MAC tag under a key
IKID∗ that veriﬁes correctly, but was not the output of a query to the MAC
challenger and has broken the eufcma security of the MAC challenger. Thus we
have bound the advantage of A in causing HN to accept an Identify phase when
the received message was not the honest output of the pisi .
Case 3. In this case we show that the advantage that A has in guessing the
test bit b is negligible. We begin by guessing the session pisi such that A issues a
Test(i∗, s∗, i′, s′) query and pisi = pib. Next, we replace the key KHN used in the
test session pisi with a uniformly random values KHN
∗ from the same distribution
{0, 1}λ, following the argument at the beginning of Section 6, incurring a loss of
qr/2λ−1. Following this, we replace the value CKID+ computed in the previous
stage of the test session pis−1i with a uniformly-random value CKID
+∗ from
{0, 1}|KDF| as in the previous cases. Similarly, we replace that the keys AKID ,
IKID and EK computed in the previous stage of the test session pis−1i with
uniformly-random values AKID∗, IKID∗ and EK ∗. We now interact with an AE
challenger, computing AE.Enc(EK ∗, A+‖B+) by querying (A+‖B+, A+∗‖B+∗)
to the LoR AE challenger's AuthEnc oracle instead of computing it honestly. At
this point, the A+∗, B+∗ values sent in the ciphertext in the previous stage are
independent of the A+, B+ used in the test session. Similarly we replace the
value CKID , and keys AKID , IKID and EK computed in the test stage the test
session with uniformly-random values via two KDF assumptions. Next, we hide
the SQNIDUE value with uniformly random value from the same distribution,
to prevent linking it with values used in previous stages of the test session.
Since SQNIDUE is sent as the ﬁrst ﬁeld D = SQNIDHN ⊕ AKID in the SUCI
message during the Identiﬁcation Phase, and by previous replacement of AKID
as a uniformly random and independent value, we argue that AKID acts as a
one-time-pad perfectly hiding the replaced SQNIDUE value. Finally, we interact
with an AE challenger, computing AE.Enc(EK , A+‖B+) (sent by the HN to
the test session in the test stage) by querying (A+‖B+, A+∗‖B+∗) to the LoR
AE challenger's AuthEnc oracle. At this point, the A+
∗
, B+∗ values sent in the
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ciphertext are independent of the A+, B+ used in the next stage of the test
session. We conclude that all values sent in the tested session pisi are independent
of any value sent in previous and future sessions, and thus the adversary has
negligible advantage in distinguishing between test sessions. Thus we have:
AdvSUPA,clean
PQID,nN ,nS ,A(λ) ≤ nNnS ·
(
AdvKDFKDF,A(λ) + Adv
AuthEnc
AE,A (λ)
)
+ nNnS ·
(
AdvKDFKDF,A(λ) + Adv
eufcma
MAC,A(λ)
)
+ nNnS ·
(
qr/2λ−1 + 4 · AdvKDFKDF,A(λ) + 2 · AdvAuthEncAE,A (λ)
)
Now we discuss how our proposal prevents certain attacks and motivate our
proposals to change aspects of the 3GPP speciﬁcation.
Update of Long-Term Secret Parameters. As elaborated in Section 3.2,
it may be required for HN to update its long-term secret key. In the current
ECIES-based mechanism this is a diﬃcult proposition as it requires a suitable
mechanism to transport the updated public key of the HN to all of its subscribers
and also an update-conﬁrmation mechanism used by the subscribers. With our
proposal, no such mechanism is required as the secret key is internal to HN .
However, updating the KHN will require an interim period during which the HN
has to operate with both the new and old key, but this would be handled within
domains of the Identiﬁcation Scheme itself.
Migration to Authenticated Encryption in 5G. Our proposal uses au-
thenticated encryption to update identiﬁcation parameters. Currently, the 3GPP
speciﬁcations do not list authenticated encryption algorithms, but instead sepa-
rate encryption and integrity algorithms, ascribed to historical reasons. Previous
generations of mobile telephony used to avoid integrity protection of user traﬃc
(voice/data) because of the substantial errors during the radio channel prop-
agation. Only the signalling traﬃc used to be integrity protected. But as the
quality of radio traﬃc improved, provisions to encrypt user traﬃc were also cre-
ated. Though we could have achieved the requisite security guarantees in our
scheme using the currently speciﬁed primitives by following the Encrypt-then-
authenticate paradigm, we stress that our approach is clearer and suggest that
the 3GPP speciﬁcations should introduce such primitives.
Replay Prevention.We include and authenticate sequence numbers SQNID
in our protection scheme to prevent replay attacks. Moreover, they also provide
appropriate resilience to desynchronization between the UE and HN as now an
arbitrary third party cannot initiate an identiﬁcation request without access to
the shared secret key K.
Chosen SUPI Attacks. Our scheme is resilient to chosen SUPI attacks
(Section 3.2), due to inclusion of the shared secret key K as the keying input for
the computation of the MAC tag MACID .
Multiple Identiﬁcation Parameters. In the case of an unexpected in-
terruption, the UE will re-attempt identiﬁcation using the same parameters A
and B . Although this does not violate the session unlinkability criterion (as it
is eﬀectively the same session), one could imagine the UE storing multiple pairs
of identiﬁcation parameters in these cases.
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7 Conclusion
In this work we introduced a new private identiﬁcation scheme for the 5G spec-
iﬁcation, a quantum-secure alternative to the current public-key based solution.
We describe the limitations of the existing solution, and discuss how our proposal
mitigates these drawbacks. We introduce a security model for Symmetric Updat-
able Private Authentication protocols, and prove the security of our proposal.
We require minimal changes to the current 5G messages, mostly utilise the same
underlying cryptographic primitives, with minimal computational overhead. As
Release 15 (Phase 1 of 5G speciﬁcations planned to be ﬁnalized by September,
2018) is not closed yet, now is the correct time to incorporate and evaluate such
additions. However, if such inclusions seem diﬃcult in Release 15 then appro-
priate provisions need to be created in this Release to facilitate such changes in
the future Release 16 (Phase 2 of 5G). Such actions would ensure that subse-
quent migration to quantum-resistant alternatives will be smooth after the 5G
infrastructure gets deployed.
For 5G, the most cryptographically relevant quantum algorithms are Grover's
searching algorithm [13] (quadratically faster than any classical brute force
searching scheme) and Shor's factoring algorithm [21] (exponentially faster than
the best known classical factoring algorithm - the number ﬁeld sieve). It is
worth noting, however, that if a quantum-resistant alternative was suggested
that utilises the symmetric-key primitives oﬀered by the current 3GPP speciﬁ-
cation (and their associated parameter sizes), then this may not achieve post-
quantum security. For example, the output of the MAC algorithm (referred to
as f1, see Table 2) is 64 bits. For such a proposal to realize resilience against
quantum algorithms [3], the standard technique to achieve this would be to
increase the length of the classical-secure key-size, preferably to 256 bits. As
regards the eﬀects of bidding down attacks, in the current 3GPP speciﬁcations,
the SUPI gets derived directly from the IMSI and thus is susceptible to bidding
down attacks (Section 3.2) by an active adversary. To thwart such attacks, it is
suggested to 3GPP that the derivation of SUPI should be independent of the
previous generations' IMSI.
For future work, we suggest a security analysis of the combined 5G-AKA
protocol and our proposal in an Authenticated Key Agreement security model.
Another interesting direction may be to augment our SUPA security experiment
to capture quantum adversaries, to show post-quantum security of our scheme.
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